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The National Health Service (NHS) is a complex
system that provides a free healthcare service at the
point of delivery in the UK funded through taxpay-
ers' contributions (Slawson, 2018). Some of the NHS
providers’ budget is spent on sourcing services from
Independent Sector Provider (ISP)/private sector. Mo-
tivated by the NHS’s Five Year Forward View (FYFV),
we choose the patient as the core focus of healthcare
planning who is to be included in the decision-making
process for better health, patient care and financial
sustainability. Most systematic studies looking into
the improvement of clinical decision-making dealt
with patients' expectations of required treatments and
their situations, and how that influences their clini-
cal decision-making. However, considerations were
slightly limited when it comes to understanding the
patient's role quantitatively as part of dynamic system
modelling.
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) have been ap-
plied to study various behavioral interactions between
individuals and within dynamic systems across a wide
range of disciplines running the gamut from eco-
nomics, politics and security, to ecology, mathemat-
ical biology, and computer science (Nowak, 2006;
Adami et al., 2016). In Alalawi et al. (2019), EGT is
used to investigate the interaction between three pop-
ulations, namely, the Public sector (P1) which repre-
sents the NHS or the public healthcare, the Private
sector (P2) sells healthcare services, and the Patient
(P3) represents a person seeking treatment(s). Several
mechanisms are available to be used with the EGT;
punishment is one mechanism that can enhance co-
operation between individuals caught in social dilem-
mas (?). In this extended abstract, we outline how the
basic model developed in our paper (Alalawi et al.,
2019) is used to explain the interactions between the
three populations. The proposed model closely cap-
tures the costs and benefits of every strategy combin-
ing decisions by agents in a finite population on either
cooperation or defection. We further introduce peer
punishment into the model: the patients' punishment
which takes the form of complaints for clinical negli-
gence (Bryden and Storey, 2011; ?).
Every individual or agent in each of the three pop-
ulations experiences one of the following scenarios
based on two strategies, namely, cooperate (C) and
defect (D). An individual from each population can
choose one of the two strategies: provide/accept sus-
tainable treatment(s) identified as cooperating, oth-
erwise can’t provide/refuse treatment(s) leading the
patient to seek alternative treatment(s) from other
providers. The payoff of each agent is acquired based
on the selected strategy played by each agent from the
three populations.
In Alalawi et al. (2019), our models (With/without
Punishment) for any selected strategy help to under-
stand how cooperation evolves in altruistic interac-
tions among individuals of the interacting popula-
tions. Here, we assumed that the populations are of
a fixed size N. Individuals have the choice to either
(C) or (D) in a paradigm shift fashion. In our devel-
oped model (Alalawi et al., 2019), there are eight pos-
sible scenarios coinciding to the eight possible combi-
nations of the basic strategies within the three popula-
tions, namely, CCC, CCD, CDC, CDD, DCC, DCD,
DDC and DDD. The fractions of cooperators in P1,
P2 and P3 is denoted by x, y, and z, respectively.
The payoff of each strategy can be written as fol-
lows: PPopulations (x, y, z) = Psyz , where x, y, z ∈
{0, 1}. For instance, individuals from the population
P1 have the option to play C or D. The selected strat-
egy will replace the s at x vertex, while y and z vertices
remain unchanged for every selected strategy for the
Public population. The payoff of randomly selected
individuals A and B in the population depends on the
proportion of both players in the population.
We assume that at any time-step, an individual B
with fitness piB imitates a randomly selected indi-
vidual A with piA fitness adopting a pairwise com-
parison rule (Nowak, 2006). The probability ρ of
A adopts B's strategy is defined by Fermi's func-
tion ρ = [1 + e−β[piA−piB ]]
−1
(Sigmund et al., 2010;
Traulsen et al., 2007). Here, β represents the ‘inten-
sity of selection’(β = 0 represents neutral drift and
close to natural selection when it is small, while for
large β → ∞ the imitation decision is increasingly
deterministic). A symmetric matrix is constructed by
computing the average fitness of an individual adopt-
ing a strategy s within a population that is obtained
from the tripartite one-shot game described in Table 1
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FIGURE 1: Stationary distribution and fixation probabili-
ties. It illustrates the parameters values as stated for each
simplex, whereas: red arrow represents transition towards
defection, blue arrow transition towards cooperation and
dashed line refers to neutral state. A high percentages 80%
of individuals would adopt cooperation with lower bP in
(II-A) compared to (I-A), whilst an adequate 1% increase
in cooperation with higher bR in (II-B) compared to (I-B)
is registered. The transition probability and frequency de-
pendency are normalised (1/N ), where N = 100. Other
parameters: cI , cT , cM = 1, ε = 0.2 and β = 0.1.
see (Alalawi et al., 2019).
A numerical and systematic analysis is performed
on the basic model, we focus on the social interac-
tions between players in each population and how
their decision influences the level of cooperation to
sustain cost-effective services and better patient sat-
isfaction. By simulating the models with a selected
range of parameters (bP and bR), (Fig. 1I-A) shows
that the DDD strategy dominates the populations’ dy-
namic by 99%. As it has been observed in the basic
model where punishment is absent, players of each
population spend most of their time at the state of de-
fecting strategies (see Fig. 1 I-A). We started by pair-
wise computation of the interaction strategies in the
payoff matrix (Table 2) in Alalawi et al. (2019) based
on different values of the parameters (bR and bP ) to
measure the stationary distribution and the frequency
of the eight strategies. Based on our proposed model,
the patient has the option to mete out a costly pun-
ishment v to the defecting healthcare provider(s) at u
cost (i.e. legal fees). The most dominant strategy (i.e,
CCC - full cooperation) is where the most finite pop-
ulations reside. When the patient's punishment is ap-
plied (see Fig. 1 II-A & B), cooperators invade de-
fectors when the acquired patient's benefit (namely,
bP > 1) is large enough, and the populations spend at
FIGURE 2: Frequency of strategy CCC for varying the main
parameters bR and bP : (I) for the basic model, (II) extended
model with costly punishment. In (II) u = 0.5 and v = 1.5.
In general, CCC performs better when punishment is in-
troduced to the basic model. Additionally, significant co-
operation is achieved for sufficiently low bR and large bP .
Other parameters cI , cT , cM = 1, ε = 0.2, N = 100, and
β = 0.1.
least 79.6% of their time in cooperation. Our simula-
tion suggests that, despite the low reputation's benefit,
cooperation is highly achievable (see Fig. 1 II). The
results of predicted frequencies for both models illus-
trated in (Fig. 2 I&II) show a significant increase in
cooperation where (bR > 1 and bP > 1).
Future work will involve investigating the imple-
mentation of institutional punishment. Furthermore,
we will introduce new factors (e.g., waiting time)
to investigate the if there are any other drivers lead-
ing to cooperation. Finally, our proposed model di-
rects attention to how the patient’s decision would im-
pact the process of collaboration between healthcare
providers, and to the effectiveness of management de-
cisions made by the private sector in influencing the
patient's choice of cooperation.
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